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Russell Davis,* James E. Wilen,** and Rosemarie Jergovic***

Oil and Gas Royalty Recovery
Policy on Federal and Indian
Landst
INTRODUCTION
Government income from oil and gas production on federal and Indian
lands has increased dramatically in recent years (Table 1). In 1980, gross
income from royalties, lease sales, and rents was $8.1 billion. I In 1970,
the same earnings were less than $1.4 billion.2 Through the 1980s, oil
and gas revenues are projected to increase an average of 15 percent per
year.3 By 1990, government energy earnings are expected to be $14 billion
annually.4
The importance of these revenues has increased with their growth.
They are the largest non-tax source of income for the states, the Indian
tribes, and the federal government. 5 These revenues are used for education, for health-care, and for other social needs. Their reduction can
cause budgetary trauma and can result in vital programs and services
being lost.
*Center for Environmental and Energy Policy Research, Institute of Ecology;
**Division of Environmental Studies and Department of Agricultural Economics;
***Graduate School of Administration; all of the University of California at Davis.
'Ron Michelson of the Minerals Management Service, Department of the Interior (previously the
Conservation Division, U.S. Geological Survey), and Robert Boldt, Associate Deputy Director of
Royalty Management, Minerals Management Service, were helpful in illuminating the federal government's views on royalty management. Jan Stevens, Deputy Attorney General of California, and
Jean Abadie and Jim Lowrey, California State Controller's Office, were helpful in explaining the
western states' perspective. Tom Wright and Margaret Rourke, of Chevron USA, illuminated the
industry's views. Patricia Inouye, Government Documents Librarian (UCD), was helpful in finding
obscure government publications. Geoffrey Wandesforde-Smith and Angus Maclntyre reviewed several drafts. Any omissions, errors, and conclusions are ours alone. Finally, we are indebted to LOGIC
SYSTEMS, Carmichael, Cal., for word processing software and hardware.
1. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY (hereinafter referred to as USGS), FEDERAL AND INDIAN LANDS OIL
AND GAS PRODUCTION, ROYALTY INCOME, AND RELATED STATISTICS 1-390 (June, 1981) and USGS
OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF STATISTICS 1-92 (June 1981).

2. Id.
3. Revenue estimates are updated weekly by the Office of Management and Budget (hereinafter
cited as OMB) and by the Minerals Management Service (hereinafter cited as MMS). Interview
with Bruce McFarland, Royalty Accounting, MMS (Feb. 22, 1982).
4. Revenue growth is expected to occur primarily from inflation and deregulation of natural gas.
Id.
5. In 1980, 23 states received $316 million from federal oil and gas royalties; 33 Indian tribes,
or allotees, earned $164 million; and the federal government received $7.6 billion. USGS supra
note 1. The distribution of oil and gas revenues from federal lands is discussed in: S. L. MCDONALD,
THE LEASING OF FEDERAL LANDS FOR FOSSIL FUELS PRODUCTION 6-23 (1979). Appendix 1 (this
article summarizes the sources and distributions of oil and gas revenues for federal and Indian lands).
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OIL AND GAS ROYALTY RECOVERY

On January 12, 1981, the Los Angeles Times reported that oil theft and
fraud were widespread problems on federal and Indian lands .6 Before
long, other newspapers published similar reports. 7 By May, 1981, preliminary drafts of a General Accounting Office (GAO) report: "Oil and
Gas Royalty Collections--Longstanding Problems Costing Millions," were
being circulated in government offices. 8 This was the sixth GAO report
criticizing minerals management in 30 years. 9
The target of the GAO report was the Conservation Division of the
U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). As an agency of the Department of the
Interior (DOI), it had responsibility in 1981 for minerals management on
public and Indian lands.' 0 The Division was being accused of royalty
6. Losses were reported on the Wind River Indian Reservation in Wyoming. They were alleged
to be only "a small part of a $3 billion to $5 billion scam involving oil and gas operations on federal
and Indian lands in as many as 12 states." L.A. Times, Jan. 12, 1981, §4, at 1, col. 1.
7. On January 15, 1981, admitted "errors" were reported on the Wind River Indian Reservation
involving $21,000 in underpaid royalties. L.A. Times, Jan. 15, 1981, §4, at 1, col. 6. By early
February the Reservation underpayment problem had grown to $117,000. Washington Post, Feb. 1,
1981, at A17, col. 1. In March, five indictments were handed down by a federal grand jury for
alleged conspiracy and theft of 7,000 barrels of oil in Cheyenne, Wyoming. L.A. Times, Mar. 21,
1981, § 3, at 18, col. 1. Two weeks later, underpayments and site security violations were reported
at leases across the country. N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1981, at 7, col. 1. On April 12, CBS Television
aired "Oil Boys and Indians," and expos6 on oil theft and fraud on Indian lands. 60 Minutes, Vol.
XIII, no. 30. On April 15, more errors were reported, involving 453,000 barrels of oil and $2.4
million in underpaid royalties. N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1981, at A26, col. 3. By the first week in July,
the federal government was blamed for mismanaging royalty collections and the oil and gas industry
was admonished for its greed and corruption. Washington Post, July 2, 1981, at B17, col. 2. On
July 16, the Secretary of the Interior appointed a select commission to study allegations of mismanagement, theft, and fraud. Its chairman, D. F. Linowes, estimated that federal royalty losses
might be as high as 7-10 percent of successfully collected revenues each year. Washington Post,
July 16, 1981, at A3, col. 2. In late August, oil losses of $1 million a day were reported. L.A.
Times, Aug. 28, 1981, § 1, at 6, col. 1. In December, extensive oil thefts were reported on private
lands in Texas. L.A. Times, Dec. 18, 1981, §9, at 10, col. 1.
8. OMB, General Accounting Office (hereinafter cited as GAO), OIL AND GAS ROYALTY
COLLECTIONS-LONGSTANDING PROBLEMS COSTING MILLIONS (Oct. 1981).
9. Between 1969 and 1977 the Department of the Interior (hereinafter cited as DOI), Office of
the Inspector General, published 5 similar reports. See Appendix 2 for a full listing of the GAO
and OIG reports.
10. The Conservation Division of the USGS (now the Minerals Management Service) implements
and enforces operating rules for conservation and production, monitors leases for compliance with
statutes and regulations, develops reports on lease operations and sales, and collects and records
payments due the federal government and Indian tribes. 43 C.F.R. §§ 211, 221, 231, 250, 270
(1981). The Bureaus of Land Management (hereinafter cited as BLM) and Indian Affairs (hereinafter
cited as BIA) administer all mineral lease tract nominations and sales, environmental assessments,
and lease documents maintenance. Id. at §§ 3100, 3300; 25 C.F.R. §§ 211-215 (1982) (for the BLM);
25 C.F.F. §§ 183, 184 (1982) (for the BIA). General enabling authority for minerals management
on federal and Indian lands is the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181 et. seq. (1976
& Supp. V 1981), the Acquired Lands Leasing Act of 1947, 30 U.S.C. §§351 et. seq. (1976 &
Supp. V 1981), the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331 et. seq. (1976
& Supp. IV 1980), the Mining and Minerals Policy Act of 1970, 30 U.S.C. § 21(a) (1976), and the
Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. §§3301-432 (Supp. V 1981). 25 U.S.C. §§396, 398
(1976) cover the BIA's responsibility for Indian allotted oil and gas leases.
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mismanagement, of maintaining an obsolete accounting system, and of
failing to collect all royalties due the federal government each year. II
Apprehension over these charges has led to investigations,"2 proposals
for reform, 13 and lawsuits. '4 On July 8, 1981, the Secretary of the Interior
established the Commission on Fiscal Accountability of the Nation's
Energy Resources, chaired by D. F. Linowes (also known as the Linowes
Commission).' 5 Its task was to examine allegations of massive irregularities in royalty payments, to investigate allegations of oil theft from
federal and Indian lands, and to make recommendations for improving
fiscal accountability of the nation's energy resources. '6
11. In 1978, after three years of study, the Conservation Division implemented a new Royalty
Accounting System (RAS). The new system replaced a single-entry, non-self-balancing accounting
system that had been used since 1925. Problems with the old approach had led to speculation that
royalty losses might be 7-14 percent of successfully collected revenues each year. Newspaper articles,
supra note 7; DOI, infra note 17 at 16; OMB infra note 65. See also J. ABADIE, MANAGEMENT
EVALUATION REPORT ON ROYALTY MANAGEMENT IN THE CONSERVATION DIVISION (USGS), DOI 4
(Controller's Office, State of California, 1981).
In 1980, the RAS was expanded to a state-of-the-art computer approach called the Improved
Royalty Management Program (hereinafter cited as IRMP). In 1981, its implementation was delayed.
This led to development of an Interim Operating System (hereinafter cited as lOS) and an emergency
contingency plan.
It is now estimated that the IRMP will not be operational until 1985. MMS, DOI (Improved
Royalty Management Work Group) INTERIM OPERATING SYSTEM-SYSTEMS PLAN REPORT (1981).
Arthur Andersen & Company has testified that efforts to implement the program will be "massive
and complex." Unless "substantial additional planning and design can be performed to insure that
the program [moves] forward in a well controlled manner, there is a high risk that schedule slippage
or outright failure [of the system] may occur." Testimony of Arthur Andersen & Co. before the
Linowes Commission (Oct. 19, 1981).
12. Between February and August 1981, the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs held four
hearings on federal supervision of oil and gas leases on Indian lands. In August, 1981, the Senate
Energy and Natural Resources Committee met on the collection, accounting, and distribution of
mineral royalties on federal and Indian lands. In April, 1981, the House Committee on Government
Operations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs, met to discuss the
administration of windfall-profit taxes and USGS oil and gas royalty collection practices. Between
September and December 1981, the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, Oversight and
Investigations Subcommittee and Mines and Mining Subcommittee, convened three joint hearings
on royalty management. DOI, infra note 17, at 285-90.
13. In the spring of 1981, the Western Attorney Generals Association, the Interstate Oil Compact
Commission, and the Western States Land Commissioners Association sent resolutions to the Secretary of the Interior urging his acceleration of plans to upgrade the nation's minerals management
system. They also urged him to conduct look-back audits of the nation's royalty accounts (unpublished
private correspondence).
14. On May 26, 1981, on behalf of Ken Corey, Controller of California, civil action no. 81-1217
was filed in District of Columbia district court alleging that significant royalty losses were occurring
and that the Secretary of the Interior was not discharging his reponsibilities to collect all mineral
revenues that were due. Ten western states supported California's complaint as friends of the court
(interview with Jon Stevens, Deputy Attorney General, State of California, Feb. 19, 1982). On Aug.
17, 1981, the Secretary filed a brief in answer to California's charges, and on August 25, he answered
the state's interrogations.
15. 46 Fed. Reg. 36,952 (1981).
16. Id.
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On January 21, 1982, the Commission submitted its report, 7 which
stated that the performance of the Conservation Division "had become
a severe embarrassment to the Department [of the Interior]." ' 8 The report
concluded that:' 9
* the USGS system does not verify data reported by oil and gas
companies,
* the USGS's lease-account records are so unreliable that the agency
often does not know which companies have paid and which have
not,
* lessees' records are seldom audited or critically reviewed,
* late payments are common, and
* penalties for underpayments of royalties scarcely exist.
On January 19, 1982, the Secretary of the Interior abolished the Conservation Division and replaced it with a new Minerals Management
Service (MMS). 2 °
In reorganizing the nation's minerals management system, the Secretary of the Interior began sweeping and costly reforms based upon his
perception that large royalty losses are occurring and that large recoveries
will be made. Estimates place losses at 7-14 percent of successfully
collected revenues each year. 2 ' All currently available estimates are based
upon extrapolations from single case reviews and upon personal opinions
by expert witnesses at hearings. No objective estimates of revenue losses
have been made, and no complete analysis of likely recoveries has been
done.
In this paper, we examine three areas identified by the Linowes Commission where the most serious royalty losses are alleged to occur: 1)
errors in reporting the quality and quantity of oil and gas produced, 2)
difficulty in determining the "fair market value" of production, and 3)
outright theft and fraud. 22 We examine the data to evaluate the context
in which losses occur, to estimate how much might be recovered if
proposed reforms are implemented, and to assess possible impacts on the
DOI, the states and Indian tribes, the oil and gas industry, and the public
at large. Our aims are to outline the complexities of royalty management,
17. DOI, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE NATION'S ENERGY
REsoURCEs (D. Linowes, Chairman) (January 21, 1982).
18. Id. at 147.
19. Id. at 15.
20. The new Service is distinct from the USGS. Reorganization establishes the Minerals Management Board, composed of the Under Secretary of the Interior and the Assistant Secretaries of
Policy, Budget and Administration, Indian Affairs, and Energy and Minerals. The Board is to conduct
interim management, monitor progress of the Service, and report final plans for reorganization to
the Secretary by 12/31/82. 47 Fed. Reg. 4,751 (1982).
21. ABADIE, supra note 11, at 4; DOI, supra note 17, at 16; and GAO, infra note 65, at 16.
22. DOI, supra note 17, at 13-39.
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to focus attention on the weakest links in the present system (namely,
sound data gathering, accounting, and management practices), to conduct
a net benefits assessment of proposed reforms, and to offer a positive
description of likely consequences recent changes may have.
QUALITY AND QUANTITY PROBLEMS
Crude oil and gas occur in a variety of forms. 23 When royalty payments
are calculated, corrections to a quality standard must be made. Crudeoil corrections are made by measuring the specific gravity of the oil (at

a constant temperature), then correcting for the amount of water and

sediment contained. 24 Natural gas corrections are made by measuring the
volume of gas at a standard temperature and pressure 25 or by measuring
its BTU content 26 after natural gasoline, propane, butane, and other liquid
"contaminants" have been removed. Quality determinations are straightforward once corrections to the standard have been made.
Quantity determinations are derived from sales rather than based upon
the amount of product produced from a field. 27 Sales volumes are deter-

mined by gauging differences in tanks of known capacity before and after
a sale, or by moving crude oil through a lease-automatic-custody-transfer
(LACT) meter which records the amount sold. Natural gas is metered as
it is delivered to a pipeline 28 once it has been cleaned.
Minerals Management Service field inspectors (previously Conservation Division personnel) are responsible for measuring and reporting the
quality and quantity of oil and gas production on federal and Indian
lands. 29 Because of a shortage of qualified personnel, the Service has
23. Crude oil can be heavy or light, depending upon its specific gravity. Oil or natural gas can
be sweet or sour, depending upon the amount of sulfur dioxide and other contaminants contained.
Natural gas can be wet or dry, depending upon its liquid hydrocarbon content.
24. 30 C.F.R. §221.43 (1981).
25. C.F.R. §§221.44-.46 (1981).
26. I.e., the thermal value of the gas. DOI, supra note 17, at 24.
27. Sales volumes are used rather than production volumes for several reasons. First, measurements of actual production rates are unreliable because they can vary from well to well and because
production from several wells is often pooled into a common holding tank or pipeline. Second,
individual wells are often started and stopped for maintenance and conservation reasons. This
introduces additional variance into overall well production. Finally, estimates of what production
rates should be (based on steadily declining field production curves) are unreliable. This is because
conservation regulations do not establish minimum extraction rates. Estimates that are based on
declining field production curves assume maximum extraction rates. Because fuel stocks are sometimes more valuable in the ground than in production, extraction rates less than the maximum
allowable sometimes occur. K. BRADLEY, THE ECONOMICS OF CRUDE PETROLEUM PRODUCTION (1976)
and Uhler, Oil Reserves Prices, Resources Paper No. 68, Univ. of British Columbia (1981). Thus,
market determinations of production rates confound estimates based on geophysical properties of
fields.
28. 30 C.F.R. §221.44 (1981).
29. In 1981, there were 63 inspectors for 17,522 onshore leases having over 55,000 wells. There
were also 75 inspectors for 1,240 offshore leases (DOI, supra note 17, at 34). 30 C.F.R. §§ 221.57,
221.12 (1981) define MMS inspection responsibilities.
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had to rely upon industry supplied figures for many years. 30 This has
hampered independent verification of quality and quantity data and has
led to criticisms that cheating and losses occur. The Linowes Commission
has concluded that "underreporting of production may be a Substantial
factor in royalty losses. "31
The data show that underreporting of quantity and quality does occur.
In the late 1970s two of nine audits conducted on OCS gas leases by the
Inspector General's Office discovered $172,000 in underreported royalties. 32 In the early 1970s, audits of 10 percent of one USGS office's
accounts revealed $362,000 in underreported royalties. 33 A GAO investigation between 1974 and 1977 found $156,000 in underreported royalties after comparing company sales receipts with petroleum production
figures. 34 Recent investigations have discovered over $1 million in underreported royalties on Indian lands. The largest sum ($750,000) was
lost by the Wind River Indian Reservation in Wyoming over a period of
nine years. 3 5
FAIR MARKET VALUE PROBLEMS
Crude oil prices are determined by the offers refiners make for feedstocks and the amounts producers accept. Transactions are posted weekly
in official trade notices and represent an equilibrium value between spot
supply and demand. Prices are a function of oil quality, its distance from
posting" to
a refiner, and overall market conditions. Many hold 3 "price
7
be competitive, 36 but sometimes "fixing" is alleged.
The Secretary of the Interior can establish his own price for oil, 38
however, he usually uses the "posted price" (or the highest selling or
offered price) as the fair market value. 3 9 In 1980, the average40 price paid
for oil from federal and Indian lands was $23.73 per barrel.
Natural gas valuation is more complex than oil valuation because its
production, transportation, and pricing have been regulated since the
industry began. 4 Today, there are "27 different controlled prices for inter30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

30 C.F.R. § 221.43(d) (1981) authorizes this practice.
DOI, supra note 17, at 20.
Id. at 20-21.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 22.

36. Ramsey, Bidding and Oil Leases, 25 CONTEMPORARY STUDIES IN ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL

ANALYSIS 152-171 (1980).
37. One such example is an anti-trust suit involving several Southern California producers which
has been pending for over five years. Interview with Jan Stevens, Deputy Attorney General, California
(Feb. 19, 1982).
38. This is done solely for royalty calculation purposes under 43 C.F.R. §§ 3103.3-4(d) (1981).
39. 30 C.F.R. §221.47 (1981).
40. Supra note 1.
41. See, for example, ENERGY FUTURE 56-78 (R. Stobaugh and D. Yergin, eds.) (1979); DAVIS,
ENERGY POLITICS 87-114 (1978); ENGLER, THE POLmCS OF OIL 310-340, 372-394,428-482 (1961).
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state 3sales." 42 This complexity has hampered the valuation of natural
4

gas.

Another problem with valuing natural gas is that it is often delivered
on long-term sales contracts. More than half of the current contracts on
federal and Indian lands are over 10 years old.4 4 Some of these deliver
gas for 21 cents per MCF.4 5 In 1980, the average contract price for federal
and Indian gas was $1.70 per MCF.4 6 Price differences have caused
serious problems among lessors, lessees, and regulators. 4 7
The Linowes Commission has concluded that undervaluation of natural
gas is the nation's most serious royalty management problem.4 8 The data
show that undervaluation of lessee-used gas, improper application of
retroactive price controls, and improper deductions of allowable expenses
have caused the most serious problems. Table 2 summarizes the worst
cases for the past 10 years. 4 9 Total losses are just over $35 million. Most
have occurred on the outer continental shelf (OCS) rather than on continental lands.
THEFT AND FRAUD PROBLEMS
Rising petroleum values since 1974 have made onshore crude oil a
profitable target for thieves. 5 0 Natural gas is not a good target for theft
42. DOI, supra note 17, at 23. Some price controls will be phased out under the Natural Gas
Policy Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 3301 etseq. (1982).
43. For example, natural gas can be flared, lost, re-injected, or used on site. Until recently,
royalties were paid under any of these conditions. These categories are now exempt from payment
(Amoco Production Co. v. Cecil D. Andrus, 527 F. Supp. 790 (1981)), and refunds of previously
paid royalties must be made, 47 Fed. Reg. 20,672-20,673 (1982). Expenses for transportation,
cleaning costs, and other deductibles are allowed under present valuation practices. Depending upon
the original quality of the gas, its proximity to a pipeline, and the means of transportation used,
deductions can vary widely. Finally, natural gas can be valued by volume, by BTU content, by
weight, and by other means. Different approaches are sometimes used in different parts of the
country. DOI, supra note 17, at 24.
44. Interview with Robert E. Boldt, Associate Deputy Director of Royalty Management, MMS
(Feb. 17, 1982).
45. Id.
46. Supra note 1.
47. Lawsuits have been filed that challenge the distinction between "contract price" and "fair
market value." Some courts have upheld lessors' interpretation that "fair market value" means "the
current market price." J. M. Huber Corp. v. Denman, 367 F. 2d 104 (5th Cir. 1966); Foster v.
Atlantic Ref. Co., 329 F. 2d 485 (5th Cir. 1964); Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W. 2d 866
(Texas 1968). Others have said that "fair market value" is the product price at the time the contract
was signed. See, Scully, The Market Price Gas Royalty Clause: Lessee's Nightmare Outside Oklahoma-TaraPetroleum Corp. v. Hughey. 35 SW. L.J. 1079 (1980). Recent DOI regulations propose
that "fair market value" should be the highest price allowed under Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission regulations at the time the product is delivered. 47 Fed. Reg. 16,423-426 (1982).
48. DOI, supra note 17, at 23.
49. These data are adapted from the Linowes Commission Report (DOI supra note 17) and several
GAO and OIG reports (Appendix 2).
50. Onshore crude is easily loaded and transported and is readily moved across state borders. It
is difficult to trace and its per-unit value is high. One truckload of stolen oil can bring $5,000 or
more (DOI, supra note 17, at 27-33).
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TABLE 2
Natural gas audits on federal and Indian lands (worst cases shown for 19661981). Adapted from Appendix E, the Linowes Commission Report and from
several GAO and OIG reports (Appendix 2).

Years

Amount Received
(in millions)

Location

Undervaluation of
lessee-used gas

1972-1976
1972-1978
1972-1978

$ 2.123
0.245
7.621*

OCS
OCS
OCS

Undervaluation of
gas sold

1973-1977
1972-1978

0.025
0.044

OCS
OCS

Improper deductions
of allowable expenses

1980-1981

12.000*

OCS

0.572
2.200
16.044

onshore

1966-1977
1974-1977
1974-1977

0.156

OCS

Type of Problem

Improper application
of pricing methods

Failure to report
lost or injected gas

Total amount recovered =

onshore

$35.030

Royalties collected for oil and gas on all federal and Indian lands: (values in millions).
Years

All oil and gas

Gas only

1966-1976
1972-1978
1966-1978

$5,648.3
6,379.1
8,395.6

$1,497.4
1,918.0
2,872.0

* = on appeal

because it is difficult to transport and store. OCS oil and gas are virtually
immune from theft because they are produced at inaccessible locations.
Onshore crude oil or condensate can be stolen in two ways: by removal
of waste oil (or diverted good oil) from waste oil pits, and by removal
of production oil from on-site storage tanks. Either method involves
diversion of oil before its sale. Since "production" is a derived measure
based on sales rather than upon the amount actually produced, diversion
prior to sale is especially hard to detect. Prevention can be accomplished
only by maintaining adequate site security." In 1980, a crash inspection
program revealed security breaches which could have enabled theft at 82
percent of the sites inspected.52
51. I.e., correct piping, metering devices, and locks on valves.
52. DOI, supra note 17, at 27 (17,812 onshore production sites were inspected).
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Once oil is stolen, it must be successfully transported off site. MMS
field inspectors have no police authority and have not been able to stop
illegal activities in the oil fields. County sheriffs have been too thinly
spread to monitor trucking effectively. Only federal marshals have jurisdiction on Indian lands. Removal of stolen oil has become routine.
Fraud, or "paper theft," can occur when bookkeeping procedures are
lax. It has been suggested that "run tickets" may be falsified,5 3 that
gravity and impurity measures may be forged, 54 and that completion of
wells may not be promptly reported." All of these crimes require a
sophisticated network of communication, record keeping, and conspiracy
to be maintained. It is unlikely that their impact could be substantial or
widespread.
The extent of theft and fraud on federal and Indian lands is unknown.
The Linowes Commission has concluded that "the [USGS] management
system lacks fundamental enforcement tools, 56 [and that] thefts are occurring [which] deserve serious national attention." 57 The data show that
some losses do occur. For example, in 1978, a USGS field inspector first
noticed increased trucking activity in Wyoming oil fields. 58 In 1981,
arrests were made for two small thefts near Thermoplis, Wyoming. Four
men eventually pleaded guilty to taking $7,000 in crude and condensates.59
"A former oil thief, turned State's evidence in Kern County, California
[reported] that he had stolen, or hired others to steal, $1 million worth
of crude in two weeks." 60 An official at a fuel oil distribution company
reported losing $70,000 of product in one week. 6' A former FBI official
who now directs oil field security for an independent oil company estimates that his firm's losses are six percent of annual production. 62 Other
private security officials estimate that losses for their firms might lie
between two and six percent per year. 63 Arrests and convictions have
occurred for oil thefts in Oklahoma, New Mexico, and California, but
most have been for violations on private land. 64
53. Id.at 32.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.at 33.
57. Id.at 26.
58. Testimony of George Campbell before the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcommittees of Mines and Mining and Oversight Investigations (September 23, 1981).
59. DOI, supra note 17, at 29.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.at 27.
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ANALYSIS
In 1979, the GAO reported that "royalties are normally understated
by 7-10 percent each year." 6" This figure was generalized from a single
1977 audit. As a result of implementing the GAO's 1979 recommendations, the USGS was able to recover only $10.1 million, or .84 percent
of the $1.2 billion it collected in 1977.66
In 1981, a GAO report claimed that "hundreds of millions of dollars
may be going uncollected each year." ' 67 Yet, in 1980, with five percent
of the Conservation Division's most suspected accounts audited, only
$7.7 million, or less than .03 percent of the total royalties collected in
1980, were recovered from unpaid accounts. 68 There is a significant
discrepancy between alleged losses and recoveries that have been prudently made.
Officials agree that estimating royalty losses is difficult. Data quality
is poor, and "the amount of underpayment [or overpayment] is uncertain
since the government's royalty records are too unreliable to provide an
[accurate] estimate." 6 9 In 1980, roughly half of the 26,769 USGS ac70
counts showed underpayment while the other half showed overpayment.
A former Director of Royalty Management for the Conservation Division
testified before the Linowes Commission that "the precise figure [of
underpayment] is probably impossible to determine."' Estimates that do
exist are probably overstated since they "rest on a small base [of] individual [cases] that were specially selected for audit." 72 Some have concluded that "[USGS] balances are virtually worthless." 73
An Inspector General of the DOI testified before the Linowes Commission that royalty underpayment might be 3.5 percent of total receipts
each year."4 The Associate Deputy Director of Royalty Management for
the MMS estimates that total losses may be $200-300 million since 1950,
and that present losses may be $20-50 million each year. 75 These estimates differ by almost 100 percent and are considerably less than the 710 percent estimated by the GAO. Each one percent different represents
65. GAO, OMB, "Oil and gas royalty collections--serious financial management problems need
congressional attention," at 16 (1979).
66. Id. and supra note 1.
67. DOI, supra note 17, at 16. Also, testimony of M. J. Socolor, Acting Controller General of
the United States, before the Linowes Commission on August 27, 1981 (emphasis added).
68. DOI, supra note 17, at 25.
69. Id. at 16.
70. Id. at 18.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 17.
73. Id.at 18.
74. Id.at 16.
75. Interview, supra note 44.
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a revenue value of approximately $30 million based on 1980 royalty
collections. An improved method of estimating royalty losses is desirable.
One approach toward improving royalty loss estimates is to summarize
the findings of all previously successful underpayment collections. This
approach will render a high estimate if audits and desk reviews were
biased toward suspected accounts.
Table 3 shows USGS billings and collections for 1977-80. Approximately $41 million in underpaid royalties were recovered. By subdividing
recoveries for the past 10 years, losses for underreporting, undervaluation,
and theft and fraud can be shown. Less than one percent of successfully
collected annual royalties are lost to underreporting by applying this
method (Table 2). Losses from natural gas undervaluation are no more
than 1-2 percent of annual collections from natural gas, and are less than
0.6 percent of the royalties collected on all oil and gas each year. Losses
from theft and fraud are insignificant compared with total royalty receipts.
Summarizing these findings across all collections shows that approximately one percent of successfully collected royalties have been underpaid
in the last 10 years.
This approach renders a significantly lower loss estimate than is usually
seen. It can be criticized because GAO and OIG investigations have not
sought losses, per se. Instead, they have sought system-wide problems
in the Conservation Division. Since USGS figures do not reflect systematic cycle audits but show balances from standard field reports (Table 3),
this approach may not reflect actual losses despite its bias toward suspected accounts.
Another approach toward improving royalty loss estimates is to utilize
figures recently obtained by states. Several states, acting under cooperative agreements with the MMS, have sought to recover their own losses .76
Desk reviews and field audits have been on going for six 77 to eighteen
months.7 Data have been compared from federal and state tax forms and
attention has been focused on leases that show large balances or a history
of problems. New Mexico is the only state that can completely evaluate
all of its accounts or conduct a random sample.
Table 4 summarizes the states' findings to date. Losses have been
discovered for undervaluation, for underreporting, for nonreporting, and
for improper application of royalty rates. Total collections exceed $42
76. Participating states are: California, Colorado, New Mexico, North Dakota, Wyoming, Montana, and Utah. They are reviewing MMS records from the past 6 years and are billing lease holders
for unpaid amounts. Interviews were conducted with state officials (Sept. 13-14, 1982).
77. For California, Colorado, Montana, North Dakota, and Utah. Interviews were conducted with
various state officials (Sept. 13-14, 1982).
78. For New Mexico and Wyoming. Interviews were conducted with various state officials (Sept.
13-14, 1982).
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million, so far.79 This amount is approximately 1.7 percent of royalties
successfully collected from onshore federal and Indian lands during the
last six years." 0 On a state-by-state basis, losses vary from approximately
four percent to less than one percent each year.8
This approach can be criticized because significant detection and collection efforts have just begun. The data in Table 4 have been developed
after two months of effort in some cases. It is tempting to speculate that
more significant discoveries will be made. However, since most state
audits have sought the worst cases, it is unlikely that the frequency of
significant future discoveries will increase with continuing investigation.
If the most serious losses have already been found, the figure obtained
by this method may be a reasonable "order of magnitude" estimate of
royalty losses as a whole.
Finally, since New Mexico is the only state that can completely review
its accounts, its data provide a measure of royalty losses rather than an
estimate. Since it is the second largest producer among the states, its
measure may be indicative of national losses as a whole. New Mexico's
revenue losses are less than 1.5 percent of its successfully collected
royalties each year (Table 4).
Rescaling the Problem
Published data do not support the claims of royalty losses made in the
press. A government tendency has been to use single examples as "evidence of substantial underpayments." 8 2 When all of the data are compared, royalty losses are much less than usually claimed. On average,
they are between 1-2 percent each year.
This conclusion does not ignore the fact that the Conservation Division's approach to royalty management has been flawed. It does not ignore
that significant injuries are presently being incurred. It does, however,
question whether large recoveries will be made by implementing proposed
reforms. It suggests that benefits may be smaller than usually supposed,
and, most importantly, that they may be nonexistent once impacts on the
states, the Indian tribes, the DOI, and the public have been taken into
account.
Impacts
In its final report, the Linowes Commission concludes that the government "must be held accountable for fulfilling a public trust [by] as79. DOI, InteriorRecovers $42 Million in Royalty Underpayments;Audits Go On, INSIDE ENERGY/
wrrH FEDERAL LANDS, 16 (Aug. 23, 1982) and interviews with state officials (Sept. 13-14, 1982).
80. Supra note 1. In most cases, records of the past six years have been reviewed. In some cases,
reviews have gone back 10 years or more.
81. Id.
82. DOI, supra note 17, at 17.
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suring that royalties are fully and fairly collected. 83 The industry [on the
other hand] has the primary responsibility for the detailed record keeping
needed to assure that all royalties are paid." 4 Pursuing this tack, the
Commission makes 60 detailed recommendations to improve the nation's
royalty management system. 85 Forty-seven bear directly upon the new
Minerals Management Service and its internal controls and procedures.
Thirteen have consequences for the states, the Indian tribes, and the oil
and gas industry (Appendix 3). If implemented, these changes may improve the nation's minerals management system. The question is: at what
cost and to whom?
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
Two thousand personnel (mostly from the reorganized Conservation
Division) are employed at the MMS, 8 6 which has an annual operating
budget of $248 million.8 7 The Office of Royalty Management (ORM) in
the MMS has an annual budget of $15 million. 8 8 Twenty-six million
dollars in supplementary funds were requested in 1982-83 to implement
the Linowes Commission's recommendations. 8 9 Half of these funds will
be used to install a new, computerized accounting and auditing system 90
which will upgrade royalty accounting 9' and will be used to conduct
92
"look-back" audits of the nation's 25 largest oil and gas companies.
Look-back audits are expected to cost $5 million, 93 and providing online access to the new system for states and Indian tribes will cost $1.2
million. 94 The remainder of the funds will be used to hire more royalty
management staff, to increase salaries and benefits, and to provide new
83. Id.at xvii, 7, 44,and 85.
84. Id.
85. They include legislative and administrative initiatives that have structural, functional, and
financial impacts on the DOI, on the states and Indian tribes, and on the oil and gas industry.
86. Interview with Robert E. Boldt, Associate Deputy Director, Royalty Management, MMS"
(Mar. 15, 1982).
87. Id.
88. Prior to reorganization of the Conservation Division, the ORM had an annual budget of $6
million, Interview, supra note 86.
89. Interview, supra note 44.
90. I.e., IRMP supra note 11, Interview, supra note 86, and testimony of Doyle G. Federik,
Acting Director, USGS, before the Linowes Commission (August 28, 1981).
91. The new system (i.e., the IRMP) has been criticized as being inefficient and ill conceived
because it does not address the basic problems of federal royalty management, i.e., sound data
gathering and accounting practices. Its procurement has been questioned because estimates of royalty
underpayments are alleged to be inaccurate and because it is alleged that the system is too expensive,
see USGS, Applied Research & Development Dept. (J. Lohrenz), BACK TO SQUARE ZERO FOR THE
'IMPROVED ROYALTY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM' (1981).
92. DOI, supra note 17, at 79.
93. Interview, supra note 44.
94. DOI, supra note 17, at 129; this amount will recur annually.
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training programs. 9 One-time ORM expenses for collecting old accounts
and installing the new, computerized accounting system could reach $25
million by 1983,96 and recurring costs for staffing, benefits, training, and
computer
access for the states and tribes could reach $23 million each
7
year.

9

An emergency audit fund has been proposed which will use royalty
payments to circumvent normal budgetary delays and to provide ready
cash for rapid responses to royalty accounting problems. 98 The fund will
be financed by taking one-half to one percent from gross royalty receipts
before revenues are delivered to the Treasury or returned to the states
and Indian tribes. 99 Approximately $15-30 million could be diverted and
spent by the ORM for emergency audits each year. 100
The Linowes Commission has proposed that the emergency audit fund
be used to reimburse the states and Indian tribes for their cooperative or
contracted services. '0 ' The states and tribes have argued that the fedreal
government should pay for its own royalty management responsibilities. 102 They have indicated what the cost of their services might be.
California, with net 1980 royalties of $36.3 million, has said it could do
the federal government's job within its borders for approximately $1
million a year over the next four years.' 013 New Mexico, with net 1980
royalties of $108 million, has estimated that it could do the job within
its borders for $400,000 each year. 'I If we assume that California's
assessment is accurate, payments
to the states and tribes could reach
05
$39.5 million each year.'
It is unlikely that all of these impacts will be simultaneously felt by
the ORM. It is likely that the states and tribes will have to share expenses
95. Interview, supra note 44 and DOI, supra note 17, at 101-104.
96. Interview, supra note 44.
97. L.e., the sum of the ORM's present annual budget ($15 million) and $8 million from the
supplementary request which covers new hires, raises, training, etc.
98. DOI, supra note 17, at 132.
99. Id. at 133.
100. This is one-half to one percent of the $2,904 million collected in royalties in 1980 (Table
1).
101. DOI, supra note 17, at 134-136. Cooperative or contracted services include royalty accounting, desk reviews, audits, and field inspections.
102. Testimony of state representatives before the Linowes Commission (1981) and personal
communication with representatives of California, Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, and others (1982).
103. ABADIE, supra note 11, and California's proposed Assistance Agreement with the MMS,
transmitted to Robert E. Boldt from Jean A. Abadie (May 21, 1982).
104. J. D. Ramsey, Director of New Mexico Oil Conservation Division, testimony before the
Linowes Commission (September 23, 1981). New Mexico is the only state that can easily review
federal royalty accounts.
105. California's proposal includes salary, benefits, travel, and overhead expenses for 23 new
personnel. If we assume that a comparable per account, per well, or per net royalty dollar effort is
required for all states who receive federal royalties, then the figure shown obtains.
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If so, one-time

capital expenditures could be $25 million for the ORM, 1°7 and annual
expenditures could be $38-53 million each year. 108 However, if the states'
and tribes' outlook prevails (i.e., that the federal government should pay

for the costs of royalty management), one-time capital expenditures for
the ORM would be unchanged,
but recurring annual expenditures could
09

rise to $62.5 million.'

Legislative and litigation costs as a result of proposed reforms will also
affect the DOI. Preparing testimony for congressional hearings, drafting
legislation, lobbying Congress, and defending the Secretary's position
against lawsuits can consume considerable resources. Six recommendations of the Linowes Commission require specific legislation. "0 Three
bills addressing the Commission's recommendations have already been
introduced."' Questions have been raised that may impede their passage. 112
Finally, reorganization of the Conservation Division has already had a
significant impact on the DOI. "3 Transfer of the approximately 1,200
4
geologists and engineers has caused serious personnel disruptions. 1
106. Expenses would be shared either through reimbursement of the states' and tribes' own
royalties as in the emergency audit fund, or by donated services as is now being done under existing
cooperative agreements.
107. I.e., for the new computer system, look-back audits, etc.
108. I.e., the sum of the $23 million recurring ORM costs and the $15-30 million from the
emergency audit fund.
109. I.e., the sum of the $23 million recurring ORM costs and the projected $39.5 million state
and Indian tribe recharge for services rendered.
110. DOI, supra note 17, at 172-174.
111. S-2305 and S-2764, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), and HR-5121, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982).
112. For example, it has been questioned by the American Petroleum Institute (hereinafter cited
as API) whether too much of the Secretary's authority will be diverted to career civil servants in
the MMS as a result of proposed legislation (API in-house response to the Linowes Commission
report, transmitted to the Secretary of the Interior, Feb. 16, 1982). Another point raised by the API
is that extension of police powers to states and Indian tribes for oil field security may be too costly
or unconstitutional on federal lands. Finally, the API has questioned whether reducing royalties to
the states and Indian tribes through the emergency audit fund is legal.
States and tribes argue that the trust responsibility of the federal government extends to full
payment for its own management activities on public and Indian lands. DOI, supra note 17, at 133134 and interview with Jan Stevens, Deputy Attorney General of California, Feb. 19, 1982. Proposals
to the contrary may impede passage of legislation.
113. When reorganization occurred, the entire Conservation Division (including its technical staff)
was severed from the USGS and placed in the new MMS. 47 Fed. Reg. 4,751, supra note 20. The
Commission had recommended that an Office of Royalty Management be created outside the USGS
and that the USGS's applied engineering and geological staff be left behind. DOI, supra note 17,
at 148-50.
114. Engineers and geologists now worry that their careers will be damaged since they are no
longer affiliated with the prestigious USGS. They resent performing regulatory and bookkeeping
functions when their professional training lies in scientific and technical areas. They are distraught
because they can no longer aspire to top management positions which will now be filled by financial
experts and certified public accountants (interviews were conducted with MMS geologists and
engineers in January, February, and March, 1982).

April 1983]

OIL AND GAS ROYALTY RECOVERY

Highly trained and experienced staff are now leaving the MMS, t 5 and
the Commission's goal of attracting qualified accounting and royalty
management personnel 1 6 may be exactly offset by their departure.
THE STATES AND INDIAN TRIBES
The states and Indian tribes will suffer financially if the federal government's position on cost sharing (vis-A-vis the emergency audit fund)
prevails. For example, California earned $73.6 million in gross royalties
in 1980.117 It could pay $368,000 into the emergency audit fund each
year. New Mexico, with gross royalties of $216 million in 1980,' 18 could
pay $1.1 million into the emergency audit fund each year. Indian tribes,
with gross royalties of $164 million in 1980,119 could pay $1.6 million
into the emergency audit fund each year. Direct costs to the states and
Indian tribes as a result of the emergency audit fund could exceed $4.8
million each year.
Another problem with the emergency audit fund is that none of the
monies collected for it are matched to the severity of problems which
might occur. It is possible that a state or reservation paying a relatively
large amount might require fewer emergency audits than one paying less.
Also, revenues that are collected cannot be accumulated from year to
year. All the monies must be spent each year whether or not serious
problems occur. Thus, the MMS will be tempted to collect and spend
the maximum to demonstrate its diligence against waste and fraud.
Indirect costs from the emergency audit fund may also occur. Twentyfive percent of all onshore federal royalties are credited to the Federal
Reclamation Fund (FRF) each year (Appendix 1). This fund is earmarked
by Congress for state reclamation projects.' 20 In 1980, approximately
$156 million was deposited in the FRF for states' use. 121 Implementation
of the emergency audit fund could reduce allocations to the FRF.
Eighty percent of OCS royalties (or $900 million, whichever comes
first) is deposited in the Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF) each
123
year. 122 In 1980, approximately $806 million was credited to the LWCF.
Roughly half of this amount was available to the states and Indian tribes
for acquisition or development of recreational lands. If the emergency
audit fund is implemented, allocations to the LWCF could be reduced.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
DOI, supra note 17, at 148-50.
USGS, supra note 1.
Id.
DOI, supra note 17, at 6.
Interview with Robert Angle, Chief of Grants Administration, DOI, Western Region (Mar.

15, 1982).
121. DOI, supra note 17, appendix F, 6.

122. DOI, supra note 17, at 6.
123. Id. at appendix F-6.
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Total indirect costs from
reductions to the FRF and LWCF could exceed
24
$7 million each year. '
A final indirect impact arises from cooperative agreements with the
MMS. The Linowes Commission has recommended:
* that uniform accounting and reporting practices be developed among
the states and tribes;
* that production, sales, tax, and other information be shared among
the states and tribes, and between them and the federal government; and,
" that participation in security, enforcement, investigation,
account25
ing, and auditing procedures be increased. 1
The Commission believes that management services should be provided
through cooperative agreements. 126 Uniform procedures will increase costs
to the states and tribes because accounting systems, computers, and laws
are incompatible. 27 Enforcement and investigation costs will be increased
by these proposals because officers will be given additional responsibilities
or new personnel will have to be hired. Total direct and indirect costs to
the states and tribes as a result of the emergency audit fund could surpass
$11.8 million each year.
THE INDUSTRY
Imposing new regulations on the oil and gas industry could benefit the
public if impacts are minor, but could be detrimental if the impact of
new regulations is severe. For exmaple, if minor regulatory changes are
made, corporate earnings could decline, but some income which was
previously dispersed to stockholders would be transferred to the public
through higher tax collections. This effect may have a net public benefit
if the impact on earnings is small.
On the other hand, if the effect of new regulations is severe (as would
be the case if significant underreporting were found), an overall reduction
in oil and gas production could occur. Marginally producing wells would
become submarginal and would be capped off. Since marginal wells just
break even, stockholders would be less affected by their shutdown than
the federal government would be. Royalties and tax flows would cease,
and public losses would be the most severe. The scale of impacts would
124. I.e., one-half to one percent of the amount normally allocated to the FRF and LWCF and
subsequently available to the states and Indian tribes.
125. DOI, supra note 17, at 210-223.
126. This is because "it would not be appropriate for the Department [of the Interior] to relinquish
[its] entire responsibility for collection, accounting, and auditing." DOI, supra note 17, at 134136.
127. There is a disincentive to alter software, hardware, and accounting practices. Cooperative
legislation of legal practices between states, tribes, and the federal government may be impossible.
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TABLE 5
Oil and gas lease-sale bonuses and royalty payments for the Outer Continental
Shelf 1970-1980 (Outer Continental Statistics, June 1981, USGS).
($ in billions).
Year

Bonuses

Royalties

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980

$ 0.94
0.09
2.25
3.08
5.02
1.08
2.24
1.57
1.77
5.08
3.45

$0.28
3.35
0.36
0.40
0.56
0.62
0.70
0.92
1.15
1.52
2.14

$28.22

$9.00

1970-80 totals =

be determined by corporate investment patterns, asset holdings, and the
liquidity of companies involved. In general, smaller companies may reach
shutdown before large companies would.
Industry officials estimate that accounting and related costs will triple
have already quadas a result of proposed reforms.' 2 8 Some companies
29
rupled their accounting and related staffs. 1
A second, and more important (i.e., greater financial), impact on the
oil and gas industry (and subsequently on the public) occurs on undeveloped oil and gas reserves. Table 5 shows that the greatest source of
government oil and gas revenue is from bonus payments on lease sales.
In 1980, $4.3 billion was collected from lease sales while only $2.9
billion was collected from royalties. Bonuses have accounted for three
times as much revenue as royalties in areas which contribute the most to
domestic production (i.e., OCS tracts). As energy prices increase, and
as decontrol of domestic oil and gas prices occurs, the value of petroleum
reserves on federal and Indian lands will rise. Bonus bids for these assets
will also increase, but a relationship between them and royalty payments
ensures that a net gain in one area will result in a net loss in the other.
This can be illustrated with a simple example.
Suppose that an oil field is expected to yield a $1 million a year net
return. 3 o Also, suppose that the field lasts indefinitely and that the dis128. Interviews with several companies (Aug. 24, 1982).
129. Id.
130. This figure includes a normal rate of return on invested capital.
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count rate is 10 percent. Finally, assume that investors must bid for
development rights and that all bidders have access to similar information,
i.e., bidding is competitive. I3' Under these circumstances, bidders, recognizing an opportunity to collect "excess profits" from the field, will
"bid up" bonus bids until a level is reached that reflects their expectation
of excess future returns. The winning bid will
be close to $10 million,
32
or the net present value of expected returns. 1
Now, for the sake of argument, assume that the $1 million per year
excess profit comes from underreporting, from fraud, or from defensible
interpretations of reporting rules. Under these circumstances, bidders will
capitalize their "windfall" into bonus bids for new fields since doing so
will confer a competitive advantage in acquiring new assets. The mechanism for this behavior is identical to the case above, but in this example,
the owner will recover royalties lost to underreporting through increased
bonus bids. His net income will remain unchanged.
Finally, assume that the owner implements a new reporting, accounting,
and auditing system to recover royalties lost to underreporting. If underreporting does occur, and if the new system successfully discovers it,
excess profits will decline and royalty payments to the owner will increase.
However, through a reversal of the mechanism described above, the
amount capitalized into bonus bids by underreporting firms will be decreased by an amount exactly equal to the present value of lost excess
returns. 131
Ironically, if the owner's new system successfully captures lost royalties, his revenues will be removed from one pocket (bonus bids) and
put into another (royalty collections). No net increase from newly leased
fields will occur, and, worse yet, the owner may suffer a net revenue loss
if the cost of the new system was high.
This example illustrates that if significant underreporting is occurring
on federal and Indian lands, any attempt to recover "old" oil and gas
losses may be successful, but recoveries from "new" fields will be exactly
offset by lower bonus bids. Bonus bids on new fields will be reduced
immediately if underreporting is significant, but increases in royalty collections will occur only slowly over the lifetime of new fields.
131. In the case of federal and Indian lands, the DOI ensures that it is.
132. $1 million in excess profits per year will be worth: $1 million / 0.10 = $10 million in
present-value terms. Bidders who anticipate capturing the "windfall" will be forced to bid against
each other until the bid is $10 million. At this point the net excess returns are zero since the
investment opportunities foregone by paying the $10 million have exactly cancelled the expected
excess profits.
133. Likewise, if underreporting is impossible, bids on similar areas will be lowered by exactly
$10 million.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we argue that insufficient attention has been paid to the
benefits and, more particularly, to the costs of reforming the nation's
minerals management system. Recoverable underpayments from mismanagement, waste, theft, and fraud are usually overstated. The best
evidence suggests that revenue losses are generally less than two percent
of successfully collected royalties each year. The costs of proposed reforms have not previously been estimated. Direct increases in the DOI's
outlays for improved royalty management could be between $38-63 million each year. This is roughly one to two percent of successfully collected
annual royalties. States and Indian tribes may pay approximately $12
million each year for improved royalty management, and may incur other
costs for uniform accounting, inspecting, and policing procedures. The
industry has already incurred additional costs for accounting, record keeping, and compliance with new rules. Significant impacts could reduce
national energy production. Net benefits of proposed management reforms
are probably negative, and harm to the public welfare may occur.
Other impacts from present reform proposals are distributional. From
a national perspective, they shift revenues away from the Treasury (by
reducing bonus bids and by reducing royalties via the MMS's share of
the emergency audit fund); away from the states and Indian tribes (by
reducing their royalties through payments to the emergency-audit fund);
away from the oil and gas industry (by increasing overhead costs and by
reducing overall production); and into a new bureaucracy whose service
may not be worth its cost.
On the other hand, any revenue losses are significant from a local
perspective. States and Indian tribes deserve prompt, accurate, and complete payment of royalties. Current management reforms are derived from
a national perspective. There is a tendency to swamp or ignore small
local losses (e.g., $5-10 million per year). A better approach to royalty
management reform would recognize the importance of local losses and
devise a cost-effective means of responding to them. This does not mean
that all recoveries should be pursued at a net national loss. In general,
efforts to collect mineral royalties should be balanced. If the costs of
royalty management are borne along with its benefits, natural and obvious
practices will obtain. At the minimum, this approach will begin with an
objective assessment of the relative benefits and costs of royalty management reforms.
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APPENDIX 1: Source and distribution of oil and gas revenues (rents,
bonuses, and royalties) from federal and Indian lands.
A. Outer Continental Shelf Production [enabled by OCS Lands Act of 1953; 43
USC 1331-1343, 1337(f)-(v) and 1338 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)].
1. Approximately 70% of rents, bonuses, and royalties go to the Land and
Water Conservation Fund each year until $900 million has been reached.
Approximately half of this fund is shared with the states and Indians for
the purchase, improvement, or maintenance of recreational areas.
2. Approximately 10% is dispersed to each of the following: Historic Preservation Fund, on-site contingency fund, and the U.S. Treasury General
Fund.
B. Public Lands (enabled by the Minerals Leasing Act of 1920, as amended;
30 USC 181-287 (1976 & Supp. IV 1981).
1. States, except Alaska, receive 50% of all revenues generated within their
jurisdiction; Alaska receives 90%.
2. 40% collected within states, except Alaska, goes to the Federal Recla-

mation Fund which is subsequently dispersed by Congress for state reclamation projects.
3. 10% collected within states goes to the U.S. Treasury General Fund.
C. Acquired Lands (enabled by the Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired Lands of
1947: 30 USC 351-359 (1976 & Supp. IV 1981).
1. States (or counties, depending on whether the acquired land lies within
a National Forest or a National Grassland) receive 25% of all revenues
generated within their jurisdiction;
2. 10% goes for roads, trails, and forests;
3. 65% goes to the U.S. Treasury General Fund.
D. Indian Lands [enabled by 30 USC 181-287 (1976 & Supp. IV 1981)].
1. 100% of all revenues and royalties generated on Indian lands are returned
to the Indian tribes or allottees.

APPENDIX 2: Reports published by the General Accounting Office and
the Office of the Inspector General criticizing oil and gas
royalty management over the past thirty years.
Office of Management and Budget (GAO), "Review of Supervision of Oil and
Gas Operations and Production on Government and Indian Lands" (Dec.
1959).
Office of Management and Budget (GAO), "Certain Deficiencies in Financial
Management of Oil and Gas Activities" (Aug. 1964).
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Office of Management and Budget (GAO), "More Specific Policies and Procedures Needed for Determining Royalties on Oil From Leased Federal Lands"
(Feb. 1972).
Office of Management and Budget (GAO), "Coal, Oil, and Gas: Better Management Can Improve Development and Increase Indian Income and Employment" (March 1976).
Office of Management and Budget (GAO), "Oil and Gas Royalty CollectionsSerious Financial Management Problems Need Congressional Attention" (Apr.
1979).
Office of Management and Budget (GAO), "Oil and Gas Royalty CollectionsLongstanding Problems Costing Millions" (Oct. 1981).
Department of the Interior (Office of the Inspector General), "Review of Oil
and Gas Lease Revenue" (Feb. 1969).
Department of the Interior (Office of the Inspector General), "Review of Royalty
Accounting System for Onshore Oil and Gas Leases" (June 1975).
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APPENDIX 3: Linowes Commission recommendations that affect the
states, the Indian tribes, and the oil and gas industry.
Description of Recommendation

Focus and Extent of Impact

Require lessees to develop a royaltypayer plan that identifies payers and
when they change.

Imposes bookkeeping and legal costs
on lessees beyond their individual responsibilities

Establish an operator of record for each
lease who would be responsible for all
production and royalty records.

Same as above, but raises possible antitrust violation problems.

Seek legislation requiring buyers to
furnish purchase records to royalty
managers (currently, only sellers must
furnish sales records).

Imposes bookkeeping and reporting
costs on transporters and refiners, especially since reports must follow a
format prescribed by royalty managers.

Develop and issue guidelines for allowable product valuation, especially
for natural gas.

If rules do not allow for special cases
(as has happened in the past), could
create additional confusion.
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Conduct look-back audits on the 25
largest companies in the industry that
account for 85% of all royalty payments.

Imposes litigation costs on the industry
in the case of disputes; present government figures are so inaccurate that
no conclusion about historical accounts
is possible.

Revise federal site security standards
and require lessees to develop site security plans that meet federal standards.

Imposes requirements beyond those that
companies feel are sufficient to meet
their security needs.

Seek cooperative agreement with states
and Indian tribes to improve law enforcement on sites.

Imposes additional costs on states and
tribes for law enforcement duties.

Seek cooperative agreements with states
and Indian tribes to improve site inspections, audits, and royalty accounting.

Transfers responsibility of "public trust"
from the federal government to the states
and tribes at a substantial cost.

Hire and train new inspectors, and increase the number and frequency of site
inspections for royalty accounting purposes.

Reduces number of personnel and the
amount of effort expended on safety
and environmental inspections.

Seek legislation imposing civil penalties fornon-payment, late payment, and
error ridden reports; federal shut-in and
lease cancellation authority should be
used for non-compliance.

Delegates discretionary authority to civil
servants, creates problems with due
process, and could impose litigative
costs on the industry.

Create a self-sustaining emergency-audit fund to deal with reporting problems that arise outside the normal audit
schedule.

Imposes constant royalty losses of 1/21% each year on states and Indian tribes
regardless of the severity of problems
on particular lands.

Seek changes in IRS rules to shift windfall profits tax calculations from the
MMS to the industry.

Imposes 50 staff-years of effort to the
industry each year; since -50% of all
royalties are paid "in kind," the problem is made worse.

Increase all noncompetitive royalty rates
from 12'/2% to 162/3% to standardize
the rate base.

Increases royalty payments to the industry and may eliminate production
from marginal wells.

